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participation across countries. Since the lowering of such costs brings into the market 
households with different characteristics than incumbents, we discuss their likely impact, 
policy concerns, and types of policies that could mitigate their adverse impact on the future 
workings of the market. 
 
Luigi Guiso:    University of Sassari, Ente “Luigi Einaudi” and CEPR 
Michael Haliassos:  University of Cyprus and HERMES 
Tullio Jappelli:  CSEF, University of Salerno, and CEPR 
 
Preliminary version of a paper prepared for the 36th Panel Meeting of Economic Policy in 
Copenhagen. We thank Giuseppe Bertola, Marco Pagano, and two anonymous referees for 
comments, and Rob Alessie, Björn Andersson, Luc Arrondel, James Banks, Carol Bertaut, 
Axel Börsch-Supan, Lothar Essig, André Masson, Stefan Hochguertel and Matthew 
Wakefield for help in collecting and analyzing the microeconomic data. The responsibility of 
any remaining errors is our own. Haliassos thanks the HERMES Center and the Leventis 






Household Stockholding in Europe: 








2. Stockholding and participation costs......................................................................................3 
3. Macroeconomic trends...........................................................................................................5 
4. The need for microeconomic data..........................................................................................7 
5. Exploring stockholding patterns...........................................................................................11 
5.1. Descriptive analysis.......................................................................................................11 
5.2. Regression analysis of participation..............................................................................12 
5.3. Regression analysis of conditional portfolio shares......................................................13 
6. What brought us here?..........................................................................................................15 
6.1. Perceived Benefits from Stockholding..........................................................................15 
6.1. Actual Participation costs..............................................................................................16 
6.2. Perceived Participation costs.........................................................................................18 
7. Where do we go?..................................................................................................................20 
7.1 Effects of Increased Stock Market Participation............................................................20 
7.2 Concerns.........................................................................................................................23 
8. Conclusions for Policy.........................................................................................................23 
 
 
 11. Introduction 
 
Only 10 years ago, the landscape of household stockownership in Europe was quite 
different than it is today. Few households invested in stocks and most of their financial wealth 
was held in the form of liquid, safe, but low-return assets. Roughly speaking, participation in 
the stock market was limited to a small segment of the population, those in the very upper tail 
of the wealth distribution, relatively well educated and with little exposure to other sources of 
risk, except possibly entrepreneurial risk. 
This picture changes considerably by the end of the 1990s. Although wide differences 
between countries persist, a much larger proportion of investors now hold stocks in their 
portfolio. About 50 percent of households in the US and Sweden, and over one third in the 
UK invest directly or indirectly (through mutual funds and other managed investment 
accounts) in the stock market. In the Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany the proportion is 
between 15 and 25 percent, but in each of these countries it has increased quite significantly, 
sometimes doubling in the course of the decade.  
These changes were encouraged by a variety of developments. Some of them were 
transitory, such as the high stock returns in the 1990s, but many are permanent: the 
privatization of public utilities, the demographic trends, and the growth of the mutual funds 
industry that allowed European investors to acquire diversified positions in stocks at much 
lower costs than through direct acquisition. Such changes have brought into the stockholder 
pool many households with less financial sophistication and more limited financial means 
than the incumbents. In addition to lowering excess returns on stocks, new entrants with such 
characteristics can induce greater volatility in stock markets by reacting excessively to market 
signals as they perceive them. If economic policy is to help avert stock market downturns and 
volatility in the new decade, it must address the needs of these newcomers and supervise the 
practices of mutual funds handling their accounts. 
  After reviewing briefly who holds stocks in major European countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK), the paper discusses the current state 
of stockownership among households in these countries, drawing parallels and contrasts with 
the US experience and lessons from modern economic theory, where appropriate. The paper 
uses detailed microeconomic datasets and explores the extent to which observed international 
differences in stockholding can be attributed to differences in a number of household 
characteristics, namely wealth, age, education, and other demographic characteristics. We find 
that international differences in stock market participation are even greater when we control 
for such household characteristics than what is suggested by tabulated data. As our empirical 
results point to the relevance of participation costs, we probe into a number of indicators of 
such costs and we find that these are consistent with the observed pattern of participation 
across countries. Since the lowering of such costs brings into the market households with 
different characteristics than incumbents, we discuss their likely impact, policy concerns, and 
types of policies that could mitigate the adverse impact on the future workings of the market. 
In Section 2, we use a standard portfolio model to show that the decision to participate 
in the stock market crucially depends on entry costs. Section 3 describes the main 
demographic, institutional, and policy-related changes that played a role in lowering 
participation costs over the 1990s. Sections 4 and 5 use data tabulations and regression 
analysis to identify cross-country differences in stockholding and to uncover the extent to 
which they can be attributed to demographic factors. Section 6 probes into other factors 
causing such differences, mainly related to participation costs. Section 7 discusses likely 
effects from widening the stockholder base and policy concerns arising from the identity of 
 2new stockholders. Section 8 concludes by pointing to policies that can help mitigate or avert 




2. Stockholding and participation costs 
In a world without costs of entering the stock market, it would be difficult to explain 
why any individual interested in maximizing expected lifetime utility should abstain 
completely from stocks. Economic analysis postulates that households care about the 
contribution of each asset to the variability of their utility of consumption over their lifetime. 
Starting from a portfolio with no stocks, and barring unreasonably high positive correlations 
between stock returns and labor incomes, a household should be willing to enter the stock 
market because of the equity premium and would not expect such stockholding to contribute 
to consumption variability to an extent sufficient to offset the excess return on equity over 
riskless assets (Arrow, 1974). This raises three related issues, exemplified by some of the data 
that will be analyzed in the paper. 
 
•  Why don't all households invest in stocks? Even in the US and Sweden, the two 
countries with the highest level of stockholding, about 50 percent of households 
do not invest in stocks, and many more in Italy and Germany. 
•  Why does stock market participation differ across countries? Stock market 
participation in the US and Sweden is about twice as high as in France, Germany 
and Italy. 
•  Why does stock market participation change over time? Current participation 
figures for EU countries and the US indicate a very significant increase in 
stockholding in the course of the decade. 
 
Although the literature has explored many possibilities, the view that seems to have 
gained most support is that households contemplating entry in the stock market face some 
actual or perceived fixed costs of entry that can be overcome only if the planned size of stock 
investment and the perceived magnitude of the equity premium are sufficiently large relative 
to the costs.
1 This literature, some of it based on large-scale intertemporal models with 
background labor income risk, offers a guide to interpret cross-country and time patterns of 
stockownership. 
Consider here the simplest, static mean-variance portfolio model where investors decide 
how to allocate their wealth on the basis of the expected return and variance of their 
portfolios. Suppose that there are n risky securities, each characterized by different expected 
return, variance and covariance with the other securities. There is also a safe asset, whose 
gross return is Rf. 
                                                 
1  An important lesson from the literature is that even small costs are sufficient to keep many 
households out of the stock market, especially since the marginal investor wants to invest limited 
amounts in the stock market (Haliassos and Michaelides, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2000; Paiella, 2001; 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). 
 
 3Let Rp and   denote the expected return and variance of the portfolio, respectively. 
Since Tobin (1958), we know that, under the assumptions of the mean-variance model and in 
the absence of entry costs, investors will choose a combination of the safe asset and the 
portfolio of risky assets with the largest Sharpe ratio (the ratio of the average excess return to 
the standard deviation). Figure 1 shows the investor's options. The expected portfolio return is 
measured on the vertical axis and the standard deviation on the horizontal axis. The curve AB 
is the portfolio possibility frontier in terms of risk-return combinations. The efficient frontier 
is CB, the upper portion of AB. Points closer to C correspond to portfolios twisted toward 
assets that pay higher returns but are riskier, such as shares. Points closer to B correspond to 
portfolios with larger weight in safe assets with lower expected return, such as bonds. When a 
safe asset is available, the choice set expands and is given by the straight-line tangent to the 
AB locus. The intercept corresponds to the case where all wealth is invested in the safe asset. 
The tangent point T defines the “best” risky portfolio, that is, the risky portfolio that when 
combined with the safe asset gives the highest expected return for given riskiness. 
2
p σ
In the absence of entry costs, each investor combines the best risky portfolio with the 
riskless asset in proportions that reflect the investor’s risk aversion: more risk-averse 
individuals will invest more in the safe asset relative to less risk averse individuals. However, 
the portfolio composition of risky assets is the same. For an investor with utility UU the 
portfolio allocation is P, at the tangency between the indifference curve and the straight 
opportunity line. Letting Rr and   denote the expected return and variance of the tangency 
portfolio, and a the consumer’s degree of relative risk aversion, and assuming quadratic 














Under these assumptions, all investors participate in the stock market and have the same 
portfolio of risky assets.  
In reality, access to the stock market is costly due to information and trading costs, 
including transaction time. In the presence of entry costs it is difficult for a single investor to 
achieve the best allocation P. Suppose now that investors incur a fixed cost K to obtain the 
best portfolio T. Then, for a consumer it will pay to invest in the risky assets only if 
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where expectations are taken over the risky assets return  r R
~
. The higher the investor's wealth 
and the larger the potential gains from the equity premium  , the more likely is the 
investor to hold risky securities. Furthermore, only relatively wealthy investors will enter the 
stock market. The poor will not enter, and will therefore suffer a utility loss. Since the loss is 
lower than if the poor paid the fixed cost, it is rational to stay out of the market. The 
difference in opportunities between the rich and the poor will reinforce the initial wealth 
difference. 
f r R R −
The model predicts a strong correlation between stock market participation and 
investor's wealth and can explain why not all invest in stocks. To the extent that they are 
correlated with entry costs, other individual characteristics may also matter. For instance, 
educational attainment is likely to be correlated with information costs. The model is also 
 4helpful to understand why average participation differs across countries and changes over 
time. Differences in average household wealth and in the distribution of wealth across 
countries may translate in differences in participation. Differences in the efficiency of the 
financial industry may imply differences in the level of entry costs. Competition between 
asset managers tends to lower entry costs. A wider market allows asset managers to offer 
better-diversified portfolios as well as to exploit economies of scale in operating costs, and 
investors are exposed to lower risk for each level of expected return. At any given level of 
entry costs, this induces more entry into the market because the equity premium per unit of 
variance is higher. 
The role of institutional investors can be seen clearly in Figure 1. The point T is the best 
portfolio of risky assets that can be obtained by combining all the securities that are available 
in an economy. In equilibrium this equals the market portfolio. The number of securities to 
include in the portfolio can be quite large. If each security entails a fixed cost, this implies 
that individual investors are unlikely to be able to replicate the market portfolio. Mutual funds 
enjoy economies of scale and can offer funds that replicate the market portfolio.  
The line A’B’ represents the best combination of risk and return when the fund can use 
only a limited set of risky securities to form the portfolio. The more limited diversification 
opportunities imply that, for each expected return, this fund is riskier. Over time, 
improvements in the industry that allow better diversification (for instance adding foreign 
securities) shift the line A’B’ to the left, lowering risk while holding expected return constant, 
thereby encouraging participation. Across countries, differences in the ability to diversify 
imply differences in participation. 
         
 
3. Macroeconomic trends 
In this Section, we describe the main demographic, institutional, and policy-related 
changes that played a role in lowering participation costs over the 1990s, some of which were 
already underway in the 1980s. Pension reforms induced by demographic trends, privatization 
of public utilities, increasing competition and cost reduction in the managed fund sector, and 
wider availability of financial information have played a prominent role. At first sight, this 
may appear as a list of disparate institutional developments with very different impact on the 
decision as to whether to participate in the stock market or not. Yet, there is a common thread 
running through them: all of these developments played at least one, and often multiple roles 
in lowering the perceived costs or barriers to stockholding relative to the expected benefits of 
stock market participation. 
A first development has been the demographic transition to an aging population in 
European countries, mirroring trends that were also observed in the United States. The 
shrinkage of the pool of young workers who contribute to the Social Security fund relative to 
the elderly who expect to receive benefits means that households can rely progressively less 
on Social Security for their old age and led them to perceive larger benefits from stockholding 
through retirement accounts. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic became increasingly 
aware of this development and lowered the costs of participation by offering tax incentives, 
e.g. tax deferrals, to households who accumulate specifically for their old age. Old-fashioned 
defined-benefit pension schemes started to get progressively replaced by defined-contribution 
pension schemes, often sponsored by employers. Households were given the option to 
accumulate stocks as part of their own retirement accounts, providing extra incentives for 
 5households to learn about the stock market and for employers and governments to disseminate 
information on stockholding. 
The increase in importance of pension funds differs markedly across European countries 
and between Europe and the US, mainly because of the dominant role of public pension 
schemes in some countries.
2 Table 1 documents a remarkable increase in assets of pension 
funds as a share of GDP, from 38 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 1997. This share, though 
increasing, is still very small in European countries with the lowest stockholding rates – 
France, Germany and Italy, as we will see below −  but high in the Netherlands, the UK and 
Sweden, the European countries with a large stockholding base. This is another way of saying 
that stock market participation is greatly favored by growth of institutional investors. 
Perceptions of increased benefits from stockholding were encouraged significantly in 
the 1990s by the good performance of stock markets relative to bond markets, and by 
increased financial market liquidity accompanied by improved standards of corporate 
governance that enhanced transparency. 
Significant  privatization programs for public utilities were undertaken in most 
European countries, albeit at an uneven pace and extent. In the UK and Italy, for example, 
revenues have been very substantial and the privatization process and the number of firms 
going public have increased stock market capitalization. In Germany, by contrast, State 
ownership of public utilities still remains relevant. The relative importance of revenues from 
privatization for various countries in the 1990s is documented in Table 1. It shows that the 
privatization program of public utilities and state-owned enterprises has granted Italy the 
largest revenues from privatization among European countries. The significant increase in the 
supply of stocks associated with privatization necessitated a campaign to expand the 
stockholder base. Households, the vast majority of whom did not previously participate in the 
stock market, were obvious targets, but their inertia, ignorance, and lack of experience with 
stockholding had to be overcome through massive campaigns that lowered participation costs 
by informing households at no cost how to invest in stocks. A prominent example in this 
context is the United Kingdom, where the privatization process and advertising campaign 
were already underway since the 1980s. 
The  European Union directives on financial integration, financial liberalization and 
removal of remaining capital controls further expanded the set of stocks available to 
households and lowered the costs of investing in them. These, together with the increasing 
policy coordination necessitated by the Maastricht treaty and preparations for a common 
currency, have meant that households now have easier access to an international set of stock 
markets, in which they can invest either directly or through internationally diversified mutual 
funds. On the supply side, the 1990s have witnessed an increased tendency of European 
public corporations to cross-list in foreign exchanges, in other European countries and in the 
United States (see Pagano et al., 2001). Both developments have lowered costs and improved 
opportunities for households to invest in foreign stocks.
3 
The growth of mutual funds also meant that households faced lower participation costs, 
especially distribution costs, and were the targets of extensive advertising by an industry 
                                                 
2 For a description of legal and institutional provisions regarding social security and occupational 
pensions in the US, Italy, and the Netherlands, see Kapteyn and Panis (2002). 
3 It is well known that stockholders, whether households or institutions, tend to bias their portfolios 
towards home equity rather than stocks in foreign exchanges (see, for example, Lewis, 1999). 
Institutional developments in the 1990s have created the preconditions for attenuation of this “home 
equity bias”, although significant changes in this direction are as yet to be documented. 
 6aiming at expanding its investor base. Going beyond the provision of information, mutual 
funds offered households the opportunity to hold well-diversified stock portfolios without 
devoting large sums to buy individual (whole) stocks, and to have professionals manage these 
portfolios and provide bookkeeping services for account holders. 
The importance of mutual funds, pension funds, and institutional investors more 
generally, as measured by the share of the stock market they hold, is one of the main 
differences between the US and Europe. Table 2 shows that this comes to 54 percent in the 
US but less than half of this in European countries, except for the UK where the share of the 
domestic stock market held by institutional investors is larger than in the US. We will see in 
what follows that conditions in the mutual fund sector are important in explaining 
international differences in household stockholding patterns. 
By contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries and the Netherlands, banks, holding companies or 
the government hold a non-negligible share of the stock market in the other European 
countries. These investors, unlike institutional investors, typically hold stocks to exercise 
control, thus limiting participation of the general public. For instance, in Germany the share 
of the stock market held by domestic banks, domestic holdings or the government is 55 
percent. In France it is 36.2 percent, and in Italy it is 44.7 percent. The corresponding figures 
are only 0.7 percent in the US, 3.6 percent in the UK and 0 in the Netherlands. The overall 
picture is one of widely held stocks in Anglo-Saxon countries, and tightly held stocks in 
Franco-German countries. 
If we focus on stocks held by domestic investors, the share held by households directly 
is 12.1 percent in France, 19.5 in Germany, 31.3 in Italy, 63.3 percent in the Netherlands and 
21.6 in the UK, while US households hold directly about half of the value of domestically 
held stocks. However, foreigners hold a much larger fraction of the domestic stock market in 
each European country than in the US. This reflects both the degree of openness of European 
economies (smaller economies are more likely to need to place stock abroad) as well as the 
nature of corporate control.  
The increase in European stockholding occurred while households were twisting their 
portfolio composition more generally towards high-return, riskier assets and away from safe 
and liquid assets, including government bonds, whose returns were declining over the 1990s. 
According to aggregate financial statistics, the share of safe assets in household portfolios has 
declined dramatically over the 1990s in all European countries.
4 Table 3 reports the 
composition of household portfolios based on aggregate financial statistics between 1996 and 
2000.
5 On average, transaction accounts declined from 34 to 27 percent of total financial 
assets, while investment in stocks increased from 24 to 34 percent. This suggests that 




                                                
4. The need for microeconomic data 
 
Aggregate financial accounts conceal crucial matters concerning household portfolios. 
For instance, aggregate accounts cannot establish whether the change in asset shares in the 
 
4 Safe assets are defined here to include cash and transaction accounts, time deposits and short-term 
government bonds. 
5 Eurostat recently made these available on a comparable basis across countries. 
 7last decade is due to a change in participation or to the amounts invested conditional on 
participation. Equally importantly for our purposes, aggregate data are of no use in assessing 
whether international differences in stock market participation and in the composition of 
household portfolios can be attributed to wealth or demographic characteristics of households 
(age, education, family size) or are due to other differences across countries. They also cannot 
address issues of portfolio transitions. Even when an aggregate asset share is constant over 
time, there could well be large but reciprocally offsetting movements into and out of the 
financial markets. 
The survey data to which we turn in the rest of this paper provide answers to many of 
these questions. In this section we describe the key features of detailed microeconomic 
surveys for 7 countries and use them to report average stock market participation and its 
trends. In Section 5 we use econometric techniques to assess the extent to which the decisions 
to enter the stock market and how much to invest are influenced by household characteristics, 
such as education, wealth, income, and age. 
 
 
4.1 Data sources and definitions 
 
Our analysis is based on the most recent and detailed household level data for six 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK).
6 We 
contrast the state of European stockholding with the US experience, drawing on data from the 
1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. In comparing stockholding across countries it is 
important to keep in mind that the surveys we use have different purposes, sample design, 
response rates, and ways to elicit household financial assets. We have made every possible 
effort to ensure comparability across countries, but significant differences remain. In most 
countries the most recent survey refers to 1998, so we use this year (or the closest available) 
as reference, even when more recent surveys are available.
7  
The French data are drawn from Patrimoine 97, a survey run by the central statistical 
office that involves over 10,000 households. Patrimoine 97 over-samples wealthy households, 
and collects good quality information on many of the socio-economic variables of interest. 
Data for Germany are drawn from the 1998 Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) run by the 
central statistical office (Statistiche Bundesamt) with a very large sample involving over 
50,000 households. In Germany there is no information on investment in mutual funds and 
other managed investment accounts, so indirect stockholding cannot be reported. 
The Italian data are drawn from the 1998 Survey on Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW), a survey run by the Bank of Italy that involves over 7,000 households. Although 
there is a certain amount of under-reporting, financial assets are deemed to be of good quality. 
In the Netherlands we rely on the CentER Saving Survey (CSS) panel, a survey run by 
CentER (Tilburg University), involving some 2,000 households interviewed online. CSS is 
targeted at the structure of individual and household wealth. Therefore, unlike all the other 
surveys used in this paper, CSS collects detailed information also on individual portfolios. 
The Swedish data are drawn from HEK (Hushallens Ekonomi or the Household Economy), an 
                                                 
6  These countries account for about 90 percent of overall EU financial wealth in the year 2000 
(Bartiloro and De Bonis, 2002). 
7 For instance, in Italy there is a survey for 2000, but we use the one for 1998. 
 
 8annual survey conducted by statistics Sweden. The most recent survey with information on 
financial assets was conducted in 1999. The sample size is over 17,000 households.
8 
UK data are drawn from the 1998 Family Resources Survey (FRS), a large survey run 
by the Central Statistical Office and involving some 23,000 households. Information is of 
excellent quality, but data on portfolio allocation is limited to ownership information for 
broad categories of assets and a banded variable on total amount of liquid financial assets. 
This prevents computation of asset shares. Finally, we use US household portfolio data drawn 
from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a survey run by the Federal Reserve 
covering over 4,000 households. This is the most detailed survey on household portfolios 
among all we use, and allows reconstructing the amount invested in stocks with greater 
precision. The SCF is the only survey where households designate their managed accounts as 
predominantly stocks or bonds, allowing more precise estimation of indirect stockholding. 
Throughout the paper, we rely on two definitions of stock market participation and two 
definitions of asset share invested in stocks. For stockownership, the first definition is narrow, 
and considers only traded and non-traded stocks held directly. Since many households hold 
stocks through mutual funds and other investment accounts, this is an underestimate of total 
stockholding. The second definition is broader, and includes direct and indirect stockholding 
(data for this definition are not available for Germany). This definition includes also mutual 
funds and managed investment accounts (to the extent that these funds invest at least part of 
their portfolio in stocks). Except for the U.S., data limitations do not allow us to distinguish 
mutual funds that invest in stocks (or predominantly in stocks) from those that invest in 
bonds, or that part of the fund that is invested in stocks.
9 Thus, reported direct and indirect 
stockholding is an upper bound for total stockholding. 
The corresponding definitions for asset shares are the ratio of directly held stocks to 
total financial assets, and the ratio of directly held shares plus 1/2 of mutual funds in total 
financial assets. Sensitivity analysis considering 1/3 or 3/4 of mutual funds as stocks do not 
change our qualitative results. Since in the UK we lack data on total financial assets, this 






                                                 
8 In the Swedish survey 23 percent of households report no financial assets. This number is 
considerably higher than in the HEK surveys at the beginning of the 1990s, where the corresponding 
figure was about 10 percent. The most common financial assets in Sweden are bank deposits and 
much of the difference can be traced to this variable. Previously information on bank deposits was 
taken from income tax returns, which gave poor-quality data for almost every household. In the 1999 
HEK, data on bank deposits are collected directly from banks, so the quality is excellent but the 
figures are reported only for deposits with interest earnings over 100 Swedish kronor (about 11 euro). 
9  The 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances defines total financial assets invested in stocks as (1) 
directly-held stock, (2) stock mutual funds (full value if described as stock mutual fund, 1/2 value of 
combination mutual funds, (3) IRAs/Keoghs invested in stocks (full value if mostly invested in stock, 
1/2 value if split between stocks/bonds or stocks/money market, 1/3 value if split between 
stocks/bonds/money market, (4) other managed assets (annuities, trusts, MIAs) (full value if mostly 
invested in stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks/MFs & bonds/CDs, or "mixed/diversified," 1/3 
value if "other"), (5) thrift-type retirement accounts invested in stock (full value if mostly invested in 
stock, 1/2 value if split between stocks and interest earning assets). 
 94.2 Comparing patterns of stock market participation 
 
Table 4 reports our two measures of stock market participation: the proportion of 
households that invest in stocks directly (i.e. without the intermediation of institutional 
investors); and the proportion that invest in stocks either directly or indirectly through a fund. 
With the exception of Italy, where only 7 percent of households invest in stocks directly, 
direct stockholding in Europe is not far from that observed in the United States. On average, 
14.7 percent of households invest in stocks, compared to 19 percent in the US. In the UK, 27 
percent of the households participate directly in the stock market, a proportion that exceeds 
the US number. 
However, the table reveals a marked difference between total stockownership in the 
U.S. and Europe. As of 1998, almost half of US households participate in the stock market 
either directly or indirectly. This proportion is much lower in all of the European countries 
considered, except in Sweden. The closest figure to the US from below is that of the UK, 
where over one third of households invest in stocks. The farthest is Italy, with only 15 percent 
of stockholders. Taking an unweighted average, stockholding in Europe is undertaken by 24 
percent of households, half of the US proportion. As we will argue the marked difference in 
total stockholding between Europe and the US is due to the much greater development of 
institutional investors in the US. But there are also considerable differences within Europe, 
with Sweden and the U.K. exhibiting higher participation rates. 
It is useful to contrast today’s state of household stockownership in Europe against the 
state of stockownership and the importance of risky assets in household portfolios at the end 
of the previous decade. Although household level data for all the countries we examine are 
much more difficult to collect for decades previous to the 1990s, available data together with 
country-level financial statistics suggest that households have made a significant move 
towards stockownership and more generally towards riskier portfolios over time (see Guiso, 
Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2001). 
In the UK the proportion of direct stockholders went up from less than 9 percent in 
1983 (the first year for which this information is available) to 22 percent in 1998. A large part 
of this development is associated with the massive privatization of public utilities that took 
place in the UK before other European countries. In Italy – the country with the lowest direct 
participation – the proportion of households that invest directly in the stock market went up 
from 4 percent in 1989 to 7.3 percent in 1998, also taking impetus from the privatization 
process. 
Total participation, direct or indirect, rose during the 1990s in all European countries 
and in the US. Comparison with figures for direct stockholding suggests increases in both 
direct and indirect stockholding during the 1990s, mostly through mutual funds. In Italy total 
participation increased by more than 8 percentage points between 1989 and 1998 (compared 
to an increase of only 3 percentage points in direct stockholding). In the Netherlands direct 
participation increased from 11.5 to 15.4 between 1995 and 1998 while total participation 
went up from 29 to 35 percent over the same period (no data are available for 1989). In 
Germany, direct participation was around 10 percent in 1989 and 17 percent in 1998. Even in 
the US, “equity culture” is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1989 little more than a third of 
Americans held stocks in their portfolio, directly or indirectly, compared to half in 1998. 
Clearly, most of the increase is due to the growth of indirect stockholding: the fraction 
holding stock directly shows in fact little change. 
 105. Exploring stockholding patterns 
 
In this section we relate participation and asset shares to household education, income, 
wealth, and age. After the descriptive analysis for direct and total stockholding, we present 
probit regressions for participation and regressions for asset shares invested in stocks, 
conditional on participation. 
 
 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Figure 2 plots the proportion of households that participate in the stock market by 
country and education level. In all European countries as well as in the US, participation is 
higher in the group with college education, particularly in Italy and the Netherlands. Thus, 
higher education entails not only a wage premium, documented by the large empirical 
literature on the returns to education, but also a higher expected return on saving through 
increased access to the stock market. This component of the returns to education is 
overlooked in the literature, but it is worth mentioning and likely to be non-negligible: a 
college educated, 45 year old individual, with 40,000 euro of financial assets, that invests half 
of them in stocks (yielding a yearly real expected return of, say, 6.5 percent) and half in a safe 
asset with real return of, say, 2.5 percent per year, can expect to end up at retirement age (say, 
age 65) with 50 percent more assets than an individual whose only option is to invest all 
wealth in the safe asset. We will return to the importance of limited stock market participation 
for wealth inequality in Section 7. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the pattern of stockownership by income and financial wealth 
deciles.
10 Participation increases with investor resources, measured either by income or 
wealth. At low levels of income or wealth very few investors hold stock directly, while the 
fraction increases rapidly with income or wealth. Notice also that the relation is convex, 
suggesting that the benefits from participation are, at the margin, increasing with investor's 
resources. The figures show clearly the presence of a country effect on participation. While 
this is negligible at low levels of wealth, it becomes evident at intermediate and high levels of 
wealth. In other words, differences across countries in average participation are mainly 
explained by differences in participation among the relatively affluent segments of the 
population. 
Figure 5 explores the age-participation relation. The profile has a similar hump shape in 
all countries, though the country effects mentioned above locate the Swedish and UK profile 
of participation above the profiles for all other European countries at all ages.
11 Differences 
across countries are rather small for the very young, but increase for middle-aged households 
who are typically at the peak of their wealth and for whom the portfolio problem is more 
relevant. Figure 5 also shows that young households have more conservative portfolios than 
middle-aged households. This contradicts the advice typically given by financial planners, 
                                                 
10 Since information on financial wealth is missing for the UK, this country is not shown in Figure 4. 
11 In interpreting the effect of age on stockholding, we must be aware of the fact that the age effect 
may be confounded with time and cohort effects. For instance, if older cohorts are more reluctant then 
younger cohorts to enter the stock market, in the cross section this creates the impression of a 
negatively sloped age-stockownership profile. It is not possible to control for such an effect in the 
absence of panel or repeated cross-sectional data.      
 11because young investors are typically advised to hold a larger share of risky assets in their 
financial portfolios in order to capture the superior expected return of these assets, and to 
reduce it as they age. As we shall see, however, the concave shape of the age profile of the 
asset share does not survive multivariate regression analysis. 
 
 
5.2. Regression analysis of participation 
 
Education, financial resources, and age are correlated: education level and income or 
wealth are notoriously positively correlated, while wealth and income vary in predictable 
ways with age, as implied by life cycle models of consumption. To account for this 
correlation and to isolate the contribution of each one factor while holding others constant, we 
report probit regressions for the participation decision and regressions for the portfolio share 
of stocks conditional on participation. Besides controlling simultaneously for income, 
financial wealth, age and education, we also allow for family size and include a dummy 
variable for whether the household head is married. 
Results for the participation decision are shown in Table 5 (for direct participation) and 
in Table 6 (for total participation). To allow for possible non-linearity in the effect of age, 
income and wealth, we use a set of age-bracket dummies, income-quartile and wealth-quartile 
dummies. We report results for each European country and for the United States. The 
excluded age dummy is for the youngest group of consumers below age 31.  For income and 
financial wealth, the excluded dummy is the first quartile of the respective distribution. 
Even allowing for differences in income and wealth, education has a positive and 
significant effect in all countries, with similar impact among the European countries. 
However, in the US, being college-educated has an effect on participation that is twice as 
large as in Europe. In most countries, the coefficients of the age dummies are not statistically 
different from zero, in contrast to the descriptive analysis indicating generally concave age-
participation profiles. 
Income and financial wealth exert a positive effect on stockownership in all countries. 
The convex pattern, already visible in the figures reviewed above, is confirmed in the 
controlled experiment provided by the probits. Moving from the third to the fourth quartile of 
financial wealth has a much stronger effect on the probability of becoming a stockholder than 
moving from the second to the third, and even stronger than moving from the first to the 
second. Furthermore the convex pattern is more pronounced for financial wealth than for 
income. 
As results in Table 6 show, these comments apply also to total participation.
12 In all 
countries, education has a strong positive effect on the probability of entering the stock 
market either directly or indirectly. More educated households are not only more likely to 
have heard of stocks, but also to learn easily about how to invest in stocks and to estimate 
more precisely the costs and benefits this entails. Indeed, the nature of institutional 
developments that took place in the 1990s, namely privatization, the demographic transition, 
and the workings of the mutual fund industry, was so involved that they were more likely to 
be understood by the educated population. 
The coefficients of the age dummies are not significantly different from zero in France 
and the Netherlands. In the UK the coefficients for the middle-aged are positive and 
significantly different from zero, while in the US we obtain the opposite sign.  
                                                 
12 Since for Germany we only have information on direct participation, it does not appear in the tables. 
 12Income and wealth have a strong, positive effect on total participation. This strong 
effect has a straightforward interpretation in terms of participation costs. In the presence of 
such costs, the investor perceives a net benefit from being in the market if the optimal amount 
to be invested in stock is sufficiently large, that is if the investor has sufficient large amounts 
of “cash on hand” (consisting of the sum of wealth and labor income). This would be true 
even if all potential investors faced the same fixed cost. In fact, the financial services sector 
offers better terms to large investors than to smaller ones, further amplifying the relevance of 
income and wealth in the participation decision.
13 The importance of income and wealth can 
be further amplified if there are peer effects. Since each member of the more affluent groups 
is more likely to invest in stocks, any given affluent household is likely to have more peers 
that invest in the stock market. This may provide further impetus for affluent households to 
enter the stock market themselves.  
In Table 7, we pool all European countries and the United States and run a joint 
regression allowing for country effects. The main interest in this regression stems from the 
fact that one can read differences across countries while controlling for differences across 
citizens in portfolio-relevant characteristics. The first column reports results for direct 
participation, the second for total participation (with Germany excluded). The pooled 
regressions confirm the increasing, convex relation between participation and financial 
wealth. The coefficients of the age dummies are negative and statically different from zero in 
the regression for direct participation, and positive in that for total participation. 
Most striking, however, is the implication of country dummies (all statistically 
significant) that, compared to average stockholding in the United States (the excluded 
dummy), average direct stockholding is lower by 7 percentage points in France, by 5.7 points 
in Germany, by 13.6 points in Italy, and by 7.9 points in the Netherlands. It is higher by 11 
percentage points in the United Kingdom. In terms of total stockholding, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK are all below the US by 24.5, 28.7, 21.2 and 6.4 percentage points, 
respectively. These controlled calculations reveal that the distance in direct and in total 
participation between Europe (except for the UK) and the US is actually greater than 
suggested by the participation averages reported in Table 4. Instead, the US and the UK 
appear closer in terms of total stockownership. 
These international differences in participation are not accounted for by demographic 
characteristics of households but by features of the country in which they live. Pointing to 
such features will be a major focus of Section 6. An important tip for that analysis is provided 
by our finding here that household financial resources matter for participation in the presence 
of fixed participation costs. 
  
 
5.3. Regression analysis of conditional portfolio shares 
 
Economic theory goes beyond analysis of the participation decision to the study of 
optimal portfolio shares of stocks, conditional on participation by the household. These are 
called conditional asset shares for short. As shown in Section 2, in simple static portfolio 
                                                 
13A recent research report by McKinsey
13 provides an example for an affluent investor (75,000 euro 
invested over a 3 year period) and a retail investor (10,000 euro invested for 3 years, plus 100 euro per 
month). On average, European funds charge 30 basis points more to the retail sector. 
 13models with investors characterized by constant relative risk aversion, the share of wealth 
invested in the stock market is independent of investor's wealth.
14 
Tables 8 and 9 show country level regressions for the share of financial assets invested 
in stocks, conditional on participation. These are second-stage regressions, adjusted for 
selection using the Heckman procedure. To identify the model, we assume that income and 
wealth enter linearly in the share equation and non-linearly in the first-stage selection 
equation. This is consistent with the strong non-linearity in the relation between 
stockownership and financial wealth documented in Figure 4. In general, we find the 
conditional portfolio share harder to predict on the basis of demographic variables and 
household resources than the decision to participate. 
Having a college degree tends to be associated with a higher share of wealth invested in 
stocks. However, the education effect is high only in Sweden for directly held shares (9 
percentage points). In all other regressions for direct and total participation the coefficient is 
only about 3 or 4 percent, and in the Netherlands and in the US the coefficient it is not 
statistically different from zero. 
The coefficients of age dummies are positive in France, Italy and the Netherlands and 
negative in Germany and the United States. However, the age coefficients are almost 
invariably not statistically different from zero. And when they are significant, the coefficients 
are rather small, indicating that portfolio shares tend to be rather constant through life. 
Finally, in all countries the coefficients of income and wealth are positive and precisely 
estimated. However, from an economic point of view, the estimates imply a rather flat 
relation between income or wealth and the share invested in the stock market. Since the 
variables are measured in million of euro, increasing financial wealth from 0 to 100,000 euro 
(well above the third financial wealth quartile for each country considered) increases the total 
share by less than 1 percentage point in the US, only 1 point in France and Sweden, 2 points 
in Italy, and 4 in the Netherlands (Table 9). Similarly, increasing income from 0 to 100,000 
euro increases the total share by 1 to 6 percentage points, depending on the country. Results 
for the share invested directly in stocks indicate even lower responses to household wealth. 
Our empirical findings regarding a flat profile of portfolio shares against age, income, 
and wealth are consistent with available panel-data evidence on the infrequency of portfolio 
adjustments during life. Perhaps the strongest available evidence comes from observing 
rebalancing practices of the same people over a ten-year period using the recently available 
TIAA-CREF database of retirement accounts of academics and other educators. Ameriks and 
Zeldes (2001) find that 47 percent of these highly educated account holders made no changes 
in how the flow of their contributions gets allocated to alternative investment accounts, while 
                                                 
14 Departures from the simple model can produce a correlation between wealth and the share invested. 
For instance, in an intertemporal model with risky labor income, more affluent households could 
devote smaller fractions of their financial wealth to holdings of stock because at high levels of 
resources most of future consumption is financed through portfolio holdings rather than through labor 
income. High-wealth households may also have less of a reason to undertake the risks of stockholding 
in order to benefit from the wealth-generating potential of the equity premium, namely from the higher 
expected return offered by stocks compared to relatively riskless assets. Finally, if low-wealth 
households are concerned at all about holding reasonably diversified portfolios, indivisibilities in 
stocks (i.e. the fact that they cannot buy fractions of each stock) may induce them to invest larger 
amounts in directly held stocks than in the absence of a diversification objective. This factor, of 
course, does not apply to holdings of stocks through mutual funds. 
 
 14another 14 percent made only one change. Account holders also have the option of changing 
their portfolio allocation by moving accumulated funds from one account to the other, but 
roughly 73 percent made no such change in the ten-year period, while another 14 percent 
made only one change.  
Table 10 shows results for the pooled sample but only for the portfolio share of directly 
held stocks, since indirect holdings are measured differently across countries. The qualitative 
results are similar to the individual country regressions. The effect of education is positive 
and statistically significant, but rather small. The conditional shares are rather flat in the 
relevant range of income and financial wealth. Most age coefficients are small and not 
statistically different from zero. But the most interesting result is, again, in the country 
dummies, which should be interpreted relative to the excluded country, namely the US. The 
country effect on the share of directly held stock does not reveal any particular difference 
between Europe and the US. The effect is negative in France and Germany, but the difference, 
even if statistically significant, is only 2 percentage points. In Italy and the Netherlands, 
instead, the effect is positive (although it is not statistically different from zero in Italy). This 
lack of pattern in country dummies signals that any differences in portfolio shares of directly 
held stocks between US and Europe are largely explained by demographic characteristics of 
households, leaving only differences in participation to be explained with reference to other 
factors. 
Comparison of our findings for participation to those for portfolio shares reinforces our 
view regarding the importance of entry barriers to the stock market in the form of 
participation costs, both pecuniary costs and obstacles in information acquisition. The weak 
relation between the conditional asset share and wealth, income, and education suggests that 
once these variables have affected the decisions whether to buy stocks or not, they have no 
additional impact on portfolio composition. In the next Section, we probe into possible 
sources of stockholding differences across countries that are not related primarily to 
demographic characteristics of households but to perceived benefits and, especially, to 
participation costs affecting their stockholding choices. 
 
 
6. What brought us here? 
 
6.1. Perceived Benefits from Stockholding 
 
Although several of the institutional developments in the 1990s, such as privatization, 
and growth of mutual funds and retirement accounts, were observed to varying degrees in 
most of the countries examined, they do not appear to have ironed out international 
differences in expected returns and other benefits to stockholding perceived by potential 
stockholders.  
The first column of Table 11 shows average yearly stock market returns between 1986 
and 1997, measured as the percent annual change (between year-end values) in the 
corresponding market return index in US dollars with dividends reinvested. Average stock 
market returns differed considerably across countries over this period. The United States, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom outperformed France, Germany, and Italy by 
at least 5 percentage points. To the extent that expected returns, as perceived by households 
contemplating stockholding, were influenced by recent experience, it seems that households 
did not perceive the same benefits from stockholding in all of our countries. The impetus to 
 15consider stockholding appears to have been much smaller in France, Germany, and Italy than 
in the rest of Europe and the United States. 
Although perceived stock market returns provide a “carrot”, benefits from stockholding 
can also come from avoiding the “stick” of inadequate social security pensions in the future. 
The realization that social security can no longer be relied upon to provide adequate living 
standards for the elderly, combined with generous tax incentives for establishing individual 
retirement accounts, have contributed to overcoming household inertia in learning about stock 
investments. In the United States, households were aided in gaining understanding about 
defined-contribution retirement accounts through high-impact, employer-sponsored seminars 
(Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz, 1996). Information on how stocks could contribute to 
retirement planning was disseminated to households in the course of public debate and 
extensive news coverage of the problems facing Social Security in major European countries. 
Households now devote to stocks a large part of their retirement accumulation.
15 
The perceived need to supplement public pensions with personal retirement 
accumulations is likely to be different across the countries we examine. The share of old age 
public pension spending relative to GDP can serve as an indicator of the importance of public 
pensions in the economy. As shown in column 2 of Table 11, this indicator suggests that the 
three countries with the lowest stock market returns were also the ones with the largest public 
pension systems. Looking at participation rates reported in Table 4, we confirm that these 
three countries had much lower participation than Sweden, the US, and the UK.  
In deciding participation, households need to set any perceived benefits from 
participation in stocks against participation costs, as they perceive them. A major component 
of participation costs has to do with actual transactions costs imposed by the financial services 
industry, and especially by mutual funds that have provided a major impetus for the spread of 
equity culture in the 1990s. An important second component has to do with how these costs, 
augmented by the value of investors’ time, are perceived by households. Lack of financial 
education, investor ignorance, but also lack of mechanisms for spreading information relevant 
for stockholders can seriously contribute to household misperceptions and ultimately to 
household inertia and non-participation. We now examine indicators relevant for these two 
types of costs. 
 
 
6.2. Actual Participation costs 
  
Constructing a comprehensive measure of stock market participation costs is difficult 
even for a single country, let alone when international comparability is desirable. When we 
focus on indirect stockholding where most of the international differences are observed, 
actual participation costs include production costs (trading costs, management fees and all 
annual operating costs) of mutual funds but also distribution costs. Other costs, such as the 
value of investors’ time spent on obtaining information and trading stocks, are indirect and 
virtually unobservable to researchers.  
                                                 
15 A unique data set on asset allocation by participants in TIAA-CREF in the United States, a large 
non-profit organization that handles self-directed retirement funds for the staff of about 6,000 
universities, secondary schools and other non-profit organizations, shows that respondents on average 
invest their retirement accounts predominantly in equities and longer-term fixed income securities 
(Bodie and Crane, 1997). 
 16  Production costs of mutual funds do not seem sufficient to explain the pattern of 
indirect stockholding in European countries. Estimates of trading costs for an institutional 
investor are presented in the third column of Table 11. The reported numbers represent the 
sum of commissions, fees and market impact in a given market based on global trading data 
of 135 institutional investors.
16 Column 4 presents management fees of mutual funds, reported 
as percentages charged by individual mutual funds. It is apparent that neither trading costs of 
institutional investors nor management fees of mutual funds can explain differences in 
stockholding across the countries examined. Indeed, management fees provide only partial 
indication of costs paid by final investors.  
An augmented measure of production costs is the “Total Expenditure Ratio” (TER). 
The Fitzrovia TER represents the drag on fund performance caused by all annual operating 
costs (including administration/share registration, trustee/custody, audit and legal fees), not 
just the basic annual management charge. The Wall Street Journal Europe reports that TER is 
1.46 percent in Europe and 0.98 in the US.
17 This augmented measure of production costs 
seems consistent with the more limited development of indirect stockholding in Europe 
relative to the US. 
  Distribution costs are higher in Europe than in the United States and they can exert 
considerable influence on household participation decisions. Entry fees, switch fees, plus 
other "hidden" fees, such as opening an account can often more than double TER. On top of 
this, there are performance fees and brokerage costs.  
In lieu of direct estimates of distribution costs, we present in Table 12 data on 
characteristics of the mutual funds industry in the various countries, which are likely to exert 
a strong influence on such costs. Two characteristics stand out: European funds are smaller 
and comprise more concentrated industries in Europe than in the United States. Both factors 
suggest that distribution costs are higher in Europe than in the US.  
The United States industry is large relative to European industries not only in terms of 
assets, but also in the range of choices it affords households among alternative mutual funds 
(col. 1). A striking outlier in Europe is France, where the number of available funds is close to 
6,000. Regardless of their number, European funds are of very small size compared to US 
funds (col. 2). A consistent message from existing econometric research is that large funds 
enjoy economies of scale and exhibit lower ratios of operating expenses to fund assets 
compared to smaller funds.
18 This suggests that US funds are in a position to pass on to their 
customer’s significant cost savings arising from larger scale compared to European funds. 
Column 3 shows that the mutual fund industry is much more heavily concentrated in 
European countries (other than the UK) as compared to the United States. Concentration here 
is measured by the market value of the 5 largest fund groups as part of the total mutual fund 
market.  
Also relevant for distribution costs is the nature of distribution channels. Table 13 
shows that there is a notable correlation between stockholding and direct sales or contacts 
with brokers as opposed to distributions via banks. In France, Germany, and Italy where 
participation is more limited, mutual funds are distributed primarily by banks. By contrast, in 
the US, it is brokers and direct sale that dominate mutual fund distribution. Brokers are also 
                                                 
16 These costs are incurred by professional market makers and affect household stockholding only 
insofar as they are passed on to households. 
17 "US funds giants arrive in Europe but leave their low fees behind", 21 January 2001. 
18 See, for example, Rea and Reid (1998) and references therein (footnote 40). 
 17very important in the UK, while banks are about as important for distribution of mutual funds 
as direct sale.  
All in all, available data on transactions costs and on characteristics of mutual funds 
suggest that European households are likely to be facing fewer choices, less competition, and 
higher production and distribution costs of investing in mutual funds compared to their US 
counterparts. 
The importance of participation and especially of distribution costs in shaping patterns 
of indirect stockholding is reinforced by examination of trends in such costs for the US where 
such data are available. This reveals that during the 1980s and 1990s when indirect 
stockholding spread, participation costs in equity mutual funds dropped significantly (Rea and 
Reid, 1998). US data are available for “total shareholder cost” that includes fund operating 
expenses (for managing portfolio investments, servicing shareholder accounts, and 
distributing or marketing shares) plus distribution costs (annuitized values of one-time sale 
charges for load funds incurred by buyers of a fund during a given year augmented by certain 
fees
19), all expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the fund.
20 The sales-weighted 
average of such cost ratios for different equity funds was 2.25 in 1980, 2.17 in 1988, and only 
1.49 by 1997. This drop was partly due to an increase in sales of no-load funds relative to 
load-funds, and partly to a sharp downward movement in the cost ratio of load funds (from 
3.02 percent in 1980 to 2.11 percent in 1997). These resulted in a significant decline in the 
distribution cost ratio, from 1.49 in 1980 to 0.61 in 1997.
21 Indeed, the operating expense ratio 
rose modestly from 0.76 percent in 1980 to 0.88 percent in 1997, despite the presence of 
significant economies of scale among individual equity funds. These trends suggest that drops 
in actual participation costs, but particularly in distribution costs, have played an important 
role in encouraging household participation in equity mutual funds.  
 
 
6.3. Perceived Participation costs 
 
Decisions to participate and to rebalance portfolios are not governed simply by actual 
participation costs, but also by how these are perceived by investors. Inaccurate perceptions 
can be induced either by lack of transparency as regards financial practitioners or by limited 
knowledge or information-processing ability on the part of potential investors. There is 
empirical support for the idea that there are information-related barriers to entry into 
stockholding. Educational dummies exhibit strong statistical significance in stock market 
participation regressions reported in this paper and elsewhere (see the contributions in Guiso, 
Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2001). More educated individuals are less likely to face information 
barriers, including those that arise from total ignorance about the availability of stock, as 
analyzed by Merton (1987) and documented empirically in Guiso and Jappelli (2002). 
Investing in the stock market either directly or indirectly through a fund involves a substantial 
amount of delegation. Delegation, in turn, requires monitoring on the side of the investor that 
                                                 
19 These are known as “12b-1 fees” and include fees for advertising, marketing, investor assistance, 
and account servicing. 
20 For front-load funds, these are charged at the time of purchase, while for deferred-load funds, they 
are incurred at the time of sale. Costs are based on estimates of holding periods by investors based on 
past behavior. 
21 The distribution costs of load funds fell from 2.28 percent to 1.23 percent, due to a decline in loads 
that dominated increases in 12b-1 fees. 
 18intermediaries or firms make an appropriate use of the funds. More educated households are 
likely to face lower monitoring costs and thus to be more likely to participate.  
Table 14 presents indicators of financial transparency of institutions and of investor 
literacy in the countries we examine. The first three columns are obtained from the 2002 
World Competitiveness Yearbook and they reflect declared opinions of top and middle 
management in the respective countries.
22 Column 1 shows that operations of European funds 
are perceived to be less transparent than their US counterparts. US managers are the most 
positive regarding the transparency of financial institutions in their country, whereas Italian 
and French managers appear at the bottom of the list. Sweden, another country with 
considerable participation in stockholding, is also high on the list. Looking at trends over time 
from the same source (not reported here), we find that the US and the UK register significant 
improvements in perceptions regarding financial transparency since 1999, whereas Italy, 
France, and Germany exhibit a downward trend. To the extent that managers’ perceptions are 
accurate, European households face greater difficulty in evaluating and comparing 
stockholding funds compared to Americans, and this is consistent with lower participation 
rates among Europeans. 
  The remaining columns refer to the ability of households to evaluate whatever 
information is made available. The second column reports opinions of managers on whether 
economic literacy is generally high among the population. Again, France, Germany, and Italy 
appear low on the list, while managers in Sweden, the Netherlands, and the US have a more 
positive outlook on economic literacy in their country. Looking at trends, the US has 
registered the most significant increase, from 4.8 in 1996 to 6.3 in 2002. A similar picture is 
given by column 3, regarding education in Finance. The tendency of managers in the UK to 
have such a pessimistic assessment of economic and financial literacy seems hard to reconcile 
with the well-known tradition of the UK in Economics and Finance education, as well as with 
observed stockholding patterns. Trends (not reported here) reveal that Germany and Italy 
exhibit noticeable declines in assessment, with little movement in the rest of the countries. 
  The last two columns of Table 14 are indicators of computer literacy in 2001, and are 
obtained from the Computer Industry Almanac. Given the considerable volume of information 
on stockholding that is available on the internet, and the variety of available computer tools 
for tracking portfolio performance, one expects that computer literacy makes it easier for 
households to handle stock transactions and to perceive costs and benefits of stockholding. 
Indeed, we see that both the number of computers per thousand people and the number of 
internet users are higher in countries displaying more pronounced stockholding participation 
than in France, Germany, and Italy, where stockholding is more limited. All countries exhibit 
significant upward trends in both indicators in recent years. 
  The overall impression from indicators of financial transparency and of investor 
financial and computer literacy is that all tend to correlate with participation in stockholding. 
Combined with the findings on actual transactions costs, this suggests that country differences 
in actual and perceived transactions costs play an important role in reconciling international 
differences in stockholding participation observed after we control for household 
demographic characteristics. 
                                                 
22 The Surveys are annual and are conducted as follows. Each year, the Institute for Management 
Development (Lausanne, Switzerland), sends a questionnaire to top and middle management in 49 
countries. The sample size from each country is proportional to the GDP of that country. The 
respondents are nationals or expatriates, located in local and foreign entrerprises in the country. The 
surveys are sent in December and returned in March. In 2002, the overall sample size was 3532. 
 197. Where do we go?  
 
The microeconomic data presented in this paper document an expansion of the 
stockholder base in the 1990s, and increased availability of more involved financial assets to 
less sophisticated investors. We showed that education, and financial resources in the form of 
income or wealth enhance the tendency to participate in stockholding. We have also argued 
that institutional developments have lowered the cost of participating in the stock market. 
Putting the two together suggests that new entrants are likely to be of lower education than 
experienced stockholders and to have fewer financial means at their disposal to withstand the 
ups and downs of the stock market. Since education tends to correlate negatively with risk 
aversion, the new entrants are also likely to be more risk averse. The presence of new entrants 
can influence the behavior of excess returns on equity. In this Section, we discuss likely 
future implications of this change in the pool of stockholders.  
 
 
7.1 Effects of Increased Stock Market Participation 
 
Increased stock market participation has several potential effects on the behavior of new 
entrants and on the characteristics of stock markets and the economy as a whole. Among the 
most important is that a larger subset of the population obtains access to financial instruments 
bearing higher expected returns and enhances its ability to build diversified portfolios. This 
greater equality of financial opportunities can be expected to contribute to a reduction in 
wealth inequality. Indeed, Guvenen (2002) shows that introducing limited stock market 
participation in an otherwise frictionless economy can have so powerful effects as to replicate 
the wealth inequality observed in the United States! In other words, heterogeneity in access to 
the stock market is likely to be a powerful reason for observed wealth inequality.  
Lower costs of gathering information on the properties of assets can lower wealth 
inequality further. As initially shown by Arrow (1987) in partial equilibrium and recently by 
Peress (2001) in a general equilibrium framework, reductions in costs of gathering financial 
information lower the threshold of wealth that triggers investment in information acquisition. 
The now better-informed households in the lower quartiles of the wealth distribution obtain 
higher expected returns per unit variance, resulting in a less unequal distribution of expected 
final wealth. 
The behavior of new entrants is likely to be affected by access to stocks for a given 
equity premium.
23 However, there are very important concerns regarding likely general 
equilibrium consequences of the wider stockholder base on stock market volatility and on the 
size of equity premia themselves. General equilibrium consequences of increased stock 
market participation have only recently started to be discussed and conclusions from this 
literature can only be tentative. One effect of the enlargement in the pool of stockholders is to 
increase market liquidity by bringing previously untapped funds into the stock market. In 
equilibrium, higher liquidity implies that sellers who are short of cash can more easily trade 
with buyers in excess of cash. This tends to reduce market volatility, attracting more investors 
with welfare enhancing consequences (Pagano, 1989; Allen and Gale, 1994). Still, uniqueness 
                                                 
23 Haliassos and Hassapis (2002) find that equity culture is likely to encourage households to increase 
current consumption and their demand for loans, both for asset purchase and for consumption. Faced 
with exogenous increases in earnings risk, they are also likely to make larger precautionary 
adjustments to consumption, financial wealth holding, and borrowing. 
 20of participation equilibrium is not always guaranteed. For example, as shown by Allen and 
Gale (1994), multiple equilibria exist when asset market volatility declines with household 
participation in the stock market: the expectation of high (low) volatility discourages 
(encourages) participation, confirming the expectation.  
There is some empirical evidence that stock market volatility has increased alongside 
market participation.
24 Indeed, the recent turmoil in stock markets suggests that positive 
effects of the increase in overall liquidity may be tempered or reversed by differences in 
characteristics of new entrants relative to long-time investors. Herrera (2001) advances the 
hypothesis that new stockholders are more risk averse than previous stockholders, an 
argument quite consistent with our empirical findings. Because of this higher risk aversion, 
their stock demand is less responsive to current stock prices, and this can lead to higher price 
volatility.
25  
Peress (2002) offers a different mechanism whereby increased participation can lead to 
greater volatility. He distinguishes between fixed costs paid to trade the asset, and information 
costs paid in order to purchase private informative signals about the payoff. When new 
investors enter the market, they unload some of the risk from existing investors and enhance 
risk sharing. Although enhanced risk sharing by itself tends to lower volatility, it also reduces 
incentives to acquire costly information, which exerts upward pressure on volatility. The net 
effect ultimately depends on the number of shareholders. For widely held shares, new traders 
choose not to collect information, and they may also discourage some incumbents from doing 
                                                 
24 Campbell et al. (2001) find that the idiosyncratic volatility of single stocks in the United States has 
increased significantly over the past 30 years. Over the same time span, also the volatility of the 
price/earnings ratio of the Standard&Poor 500 index has increased (Herrera, 2001). 

















= τ  denote the degree of absolute risk tolerance, the 
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Thus, less (absolute) risk tolerant investors are less responsive to stock market prices (and market 
riskiness). Suppose that absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth and that consumers differ in 
their wealth endowment. Then, when entry costs fall, the new entrants are consumers with lower than 
average wealth than existing stockholders, and lower risk tolerance. As a consequence, the price 
elasticity of the demand for stocks falls and, in equilibrium, stock prices are more volatile. 
 21so.
26 Thus, the information content of prices is reduced and volatility rises.
27 Interestingly, if 
there is an exogenously generated reduction in the entry cost to the market for widely held 
stocks, then new entrants do not purchase information and reduce the incentives of 
incumbents to purchase information making them also uninformed. Stock prices, noise, and 
volatility soar in this case that is most relevant for our discussion. In all cases, the average risk 
premium declines with the number of shareholders.    
Increased participation can lower the equity premium in some models (e.g, in the Peress 
model), but this is not always true. For one thing, the effect on the premium might be 
tempered if stock supply itself increases with stockownership, as is typically the case with 
privatizations. Furthermore, new entrants are likely to differ from incumbents in terms of risk 
aversion and wealth, as we found above. If marginal stockholders are on average more risk 
averse than incumbents, then this heterogeneity by itself tends to raise the equity premium. 
Because of higher risk aversion, more limited wealth and related factors, marginal 
stockholders tend to invest less in stocks than incumbents. To the extent that they invest little, 
they are unlikely to have big effects on the equity premium (Polkovnichenko, 2000).  
Indeed, there is a class of general equilibrium models that compare steady states with 
limited participation against those with full participation in the stock market and have shown 
that asset returns are not likely to change much in response to more extensive participation.
28 
They typically specify exogenously fixed asset supplies and a fixed percentage of households 
who are assumed to have no access to stocks, and then they either impose that the rest hold 
stocks or they give them the option to hold stocks. The overall conclusion from this class of 
models is that changes in stock market participation are not the key to matching the 
historically observed equity premium or to explaining the recent behavior of stock prices. 
A recent paper by Calvet et al. (2001) focuses on the likely effects of financial 
innovation on participation in risky assets, the riskless interest rate, and the equity premium. 
Financial innovation encourages households to participate in the risky asset market for 
hedging and diversification purposes. At the same time, the existence of new assets reduces 
the precautionary motive of market participants, thus raising the riskless interest rate. This 
increase in the riskless rate militates against increased participation in risky assets, but it is 
often dominated by the hedging effect and participation rises. Under some conditions on the 
cross-sectional distribution of risks, new financial instruments encourage participation and 
reduce the covariance between stock returns and mean consumption of participants, lowering 
the equity premium. 
Overall, these papers seem to imply that the effect of increased participation on the 
equity premium may be negative, but is unlikely to be sizeable given the limited investment 
of new entrants. There are ways in which the spread of equity culture can enhance stock 
market volatility and ways in which it can reduce it, but the net effect appears to be 
ambiguous on the basis of existing theoretical literature. 
 
  
                                                 
26 If stock supply is so inelastic that incumbents are forced to hold sufficiently smaller positions. 
27 The result is not unambiguous for narrowly-held stocks. In this case, all entrants choose to acquire 
some information but, if the demand for information by incumbents is sensitive enough, aggregate 
information falls, and noise and volatility rise. 
28 These include Allen and Gale (1994), Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Heaton and Lucas 
(1999), and Polkovnichenko (2000). 
 227.2 Concerns 
 
While the move towards more widespread access to the stock market widens the 
opportunity set of previously excluded investors, it also raises concerns mostly related to the 
fact that lower entry costs change the composition of stockholders. Investors that entered the 
stock market after the reduction in entry costs are significantly different from the preexisting 
ones; otherwise they would have entered earlier. They tend to be less wealthy, more risk 
averse and less educated. As a result, they are likely to be less “sophisticated” and more 
vulnerable to the swings of stock market prices. 
A prominent concern is the ability of new stockholders to assess the riskiness of their 
portfolios and to respond optimally to changes in the financial environment given their 
limited experience with stockholding. Many households entered attracted by the massive 
increase in stock prices during the late 1990s. As a consequence, some of these investors may 
have incurred significant losses in the subsequent crash. Poor financial education may have 
led them to overestimate expected returns during the boom as well as losses during the crash. 
In some instances losses may be irreversible, as those incurred by persons close to retirement. 
All these considerations raise the possibility of massive and premature exodus from the stock 
market due to poor assessment and limited ability to withstand financial pressure. 
Even if new entrants remain in the market, they may be induced by lack of 
sophistication or by frustration with market performance to trade more frequently than is 
warranted and to be more susceptible to “tips” or “fads” not based on fundamentals. The 
lowering of transactions costs can perversely contribute to such phenomena. In an interesting 
paper, Barber and Odean (2000) argue that the recent easy access to trading stock through the 
Internet has induced a sense of over-confidence that has led investors to trade too often, 
incurring significant losses relative to market returns.
29 
Countries in which stockholding is mostly in indirect form (especially, passive 
stockholding through pension and insurance funds) are likely to be less susceptible to such 
problems. Future data will enable researchers to study stockholding after the stock market 
decline of 2001-02, and to understand if the increase in European stockholding is a permanent 
feature that cannot be reversed by even sharp fluctuations in stock market prices. 
 
 
8. Conclusions for Policy 
 
We argued above that concerns for the future of household stockholding in Europe arise 
mostly because of the limited sophistication of new entrants to the stockholder pool and its 
interaction with their limited ability to withstand financial pressure. It is, therefore, natural to 
ask whether there is room for policies to alleviate the root of the problem.  
One important unsettled issue is whether the role of providing financial education 
should be left to the market or whether governments should intervene with specific financial 
education programs. Merton (1987) argued that limited information about financial assets 
limits the demand for these assets, so issuers do have an incentive to communicate financial 
                                                 
29 They report that, of 66,465 households with direct holdings of common stock and accounts at a large 
discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn annually 11.4 percent, instead of the 
market return of 17.9 percent.  
 
 23information. There is in fact evidence that financial intermediaries and fund managers 
disseminate financial information and contribute to some extent to educate investors. Guiso 
and Jappelli (2002) find that in Italy local financial market development is actually correlated 
with consumers' knowledge of the existence of a broader asset menu. In this respect, the 
market seems to spread information. 
In addition to information provided by financial practitioners, there are financial 
information spillovers from informed to uninformed consumers in the same social circle. 
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2001) show that stock market participation is higher among 
individuals that entertain intense social interactions. Furthermore, this effect is stronger 
among individuals living in communities with a higher participation rate to begin with, 
implying that social learning interacts positively with learning induced by market 
development. Similarly, Duflo and Saez (2002) show that in the US the decision to participate 
in Tax Deferred Accounts is significantly affected by a similar decision of employees in the 
same department. Thus, the experience of peers about the performance of their investments is 
passed on to others. Whether this provides the efficient amount of information is, of course, 
hard to say. The finding of Bayer et al. (1996) that employer-sponsored seminars were most 
effective in enlisting employers for individual retirement accounts in the United States, along 
with the success of government advertising campaigns during UK privatizations, suggest that 
the State has a role to play in disseminating information, especially for stockholding 
opportunities relating to its own policies and programs. 
A related but distinct issue is whether there is need for government control of the 
quality of information being disseminated to investors by the market. As entry costs decrease 
and less informed investors enter the market, fund managers may have incentives to provide 
untruthful information, profit from their information advantage, and abuse their role as 
financial advisors. Mutual funds are often complicated instruments with contractual 
provisions that are not easy to grasp even for relatively well-educated investors. Very often 
the sellers of these instruments provide also financial advice and can therefore manipulate the 
information they transmit in their own interest, whether by understating the riskiness of the 
instrument, hiding or simply not mentioning exit costs or more profitable alternative financial 
instruments. 
More generally, the growth in managed investment accounts and the fact that they 
typically sell to investors with little or no financial information implies a sharp increase in 
delegation to manage one’s portfolio. Delegation and limited information imply that 
professional investors and individual investors may not share the same objectives. Increased 
delegation creates preconditions for the possible emergence of fraud, which in turn can 
threaten or even block the further development of stockownership if consumers perceive a 
risk of fraud.
30 
It may be tempting to argue that competition and information transmission tend to 
correct abuses, obviating the need for government intervention. Yet, it is often difficult for a 
consumer to find out whether a bad financial return was the consequence of bad advice or the 
result of an adverse market outcome. Furthermore, exit costs tend to slow down migration to 
other funds. All in all, it seems that public provision of financial information, along with 
public monitoring and supervision, should accompany the growth of indirect stockholding. 
                                                 
30 Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2000) find that in Italian provinces with relatively high social trust  
(which can be associated with a higher level of delegation), the proportion of stockholders is higher, 
other things equal. 
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Total assets of pension funds as 
Percent of GDP  
  Total amount raised from 
privatization 
1990-1999 total as a % of 1999 
GDP 
1990 1997 
      
France 4.6  0.0  5.6 
Germany 1.2  3.4  5.8 
Italy 9.0  0.2  3.0 
Netherlands 3.8  81.6  87.3 
Sweden 3.8  31.0  32.6 
United Kingdom  5.1  59.7  74.7 
United States  0.0  38.1  58.2 
 
Note. The table reports total pension fund assets as a percent of GDP in 1990 and 1997 and total sales from 
privatization between 1990 and 1999 as a percentage of 1999 GDP. Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends, n. 
76, June 2000. 
 
 
 34Table 2 
Stock Market Capitalization, by Type of Investor 
 
 




Foreign 36.5  19.9  15.7  43.6  38.9  29.3  6.4 
 
Home 63.5  80.1  84.3  56.4  61.1  70.7  93.6 
 
Institutional investors, of which  19.6  9.6  13.2  20.7  28.3  50.8  50.5 
              
Life insurance and pension funds  7.3 4.9  3.7 n.a.  n.a.  41.1  n.a. 
              
Managed investment accountss  0.0 0.0  2.7 n.a.  n.a.  7.0  n.a. 
 
Mutual funds  12.4 4.7  6.8  n.a.  n.a.  2.7  n.a. 
 
Banks 8.9  8.4  6.3  0.0  n.a.  0.0  0.0 
 
Holdings 20.8  40.1  23.7  0.0  10.3  3.5  0.0 
 
Households 7.7  15.6  26.4  35.7  13.1  15.3  42.4 
 
Public sector  6.5  6.4  14.7  0.0  9.4  0.1  0.7 
 
Market capitalization (billions euro)  1540  1352  818  682  350  2744  12187 
 
Note. Data refer to December 2000. Source: Filippa and Franzosi (2001). 
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Table 3  
Changes in Portfolios of European Households  
 
 France  Germany  Italy  Nether.  Sweden  UK  Europe  US 
 
  '96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 96 '00 
Transaction 
accounts 
34 25 41 34 38 25 21 19 23 15 24 22 34 27 16 14 
Shares and other 
equity 
36 46 19 27 19 43 20 23 31 44 20 23 24 34 32 33 
Securities (other 
than shares) 
4 2  13  10  31  19  3 2 8 3 1 1  11  7 9 6 
Insurance 
technical reserves 
22 23 26 28 11 13 53 56 25 29 51 50 29 30  7  7 
 
Note. The table is based on aggregate financial statistics reconstructed from Eurostat and the US Flow of Funds 
Accounts (Massaro and Laakari, 2002). The European average refers to the EU countries. The six European 
countries examined account for over 90 percent of the EU financial assets.  
 
 
 36Table 4 
Microeconomic Surveys and Stock Market Participation 
 




























Direct participation  
 
0.15  0.17  0.07 0.14 0.27 0.27 0.19 
Total    participation  0.23  -.-  0.15 0.24 0.54 0.34 0.48 
 
Note. In all countries except the United States total participation is defined as households investing in stocks or 
mutual funds. Data refer to 1998, except for Sweden where they refer to 1999. 
 
 37Table 5 
Probit Regressions for Direct Participation 
 
 


















































































































































































































Number of  
observations 
10207 39393  7147  1679  17043  22858  4305 
 
Note. In Sweden very few households in the first wealth quartile have stocks. The regression therefore uses 
financial wealth tertiles. The coefficients in the table indicate the effect of the independent variable on the 
probability of stockownership. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient 
is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, two stars at the 10 percent level. 
 38Table 6 
Probit Regressions for Total Participation  
 
 













































































































































































10207 7147  1679  17043  22858  4305 
 
Note. In Sweden very few households in the first wealth quartile have stocks. The regression therefore uses 
financial wealth tertiles. The coefficients in the table indicate the effect of the independent variable on the 
probability of stockownership. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient 






 39Table 7 























































































Note. The coefficients in the table indicate the effect of the independent variable on the probability of 
stockownership. Germany is not included in the regression for total participation. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, two 
stars at the 10 percent level. 
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Number of uncensored 
observations 
 
1702 8247 578  276  5036  775 
 
 
Note. The first stage regression includes dummies for married and college degree, family size, and dummies for 
income and financial wealth quartiles. Income and wealth are measured in million of euro. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent 
level, two stars at the 10 percent level. 
 
 41Table 9 
Regressions for Asset Share of Stocks Held Directly or Indirectly 
 
 
















































































































Number of uncensored observations 
 
2556 1144  455  10055  1845 
 
Note. The first stage regression includes dummies for married and college degree, family size, and dummies for 
income and financial wealth quartiles. Income and wealth are measured in million of euro. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent 
level, two stars at the 10 percent level. 
 42Table 10 












Age 31-40  -0.0102 
(0.0092) 
Age 41-50  -0.0410 
(0.0095)** 
Age 51-60  -0.0420 
(0.0095)** 
Age 61-70  -0.0066 
(0.0101) 




















Note. The first stage regression includes dummies for married and college degree, family size, and dummies for 
income and financial wealth quartiles. Income and wealth are measured in million of euro. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. One star indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent 
level, two stars at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
 43Table 11 
Indicators of Benefits and Costs from Stockholding 
 
 
 Yearly  market 
return 
Old age public pension spending 







France 11.07  10.36  27.63  1.2 
Germany 10.13  10.29  29.70  0.8 
Italy 4.14  10.99  29.84  2.0 
Netherlands 18.68  6.75  34.56  0.5 
Sweden 16.85  8.17  32.26  -.- 
United Kingdom  15.73  6.73  51.88  1.2 
United States 











Note. Yearly market return is the percent annual change in the corresponding MSCI market return index in US 
dollars, with dividends reinvested, between 1986 and 1997, year-end-values. Source: Pagano et al., Table 4 
(drawn from Elkins/McSherry Co., Inc.). Old age public pension spending as a percentage to GDP is drawn 
from Palacios and Pallarès-Miralles (2000). Data refer to 1995-97. Stock market trading costs is the sum of 
commission, fees and market impact in a given market based on global trading data of 135 institutional 
investors. It refers to the 3
rd quarter of 1998 and is expressed in basis points. Source: Pagano et al., Table 4 
(drawn from Elkins/McSherry Co., Inc.). Management fees are percentages charged by the individual mutual 






 44Table 12 
Characteristics of the Mutual Funds Industry 
 
 






in equity (%) 
France 5836  87  62  13.6 
Germany 717  207  62  37.9 
Italy 626  337  43  20.4 
Netherlands 179 440 60  53.8 
Sweden -.-  -.-  -.-  -.- 
United Kingdom  1455  163  20  85.8 
United States  6,900  647  18  53.0 
 
 
Note. Concentration ratio is the market value of the 5 largest fund groups as part of the total mutual fund market. 





 45Table 13 
Distribution Channels of Mutual Funds 
 
 
 Direct  sale  Brokers  Banks 
 
Other 
France 1.0  13.5  73.7  11.8 
Germany 9.8  11.7  72.5  6.0 
Italy 0.6  15.6  83.7  0.1 
Netherlands -.-  -.-  -.-  -.- 
Sweden -.-  -.-  -.-  -.- 
United Kingdom  17.3  54.7  19.9  8.1 
United States  32.0  40.0  8.0  20.0 
 
 








 46Table 14 


















France 6.10  4.64  5.28  419  209 
Germany 7.22  5.11  5.19  436  308 
Italy 5.01  3.98  3.73  347  307 
Netherlands 7.66  7.21 7.56  510  448 
Sweden 7.50  7.21  7.28  626  554 
United Kingdom  6.89  4.44  4.58  492  402 
United States  8.06  6.35  6.25  639  522 
 
Note. Financial institutions' transparency is widely developed in your country? (refers to 2002). Source: World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2002.Economic literacy is generally high among the population? (refers to 2002). 
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002.Education in finance is sufficient in your country? (refers to 
2002). Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002.Number of computers per 1000 people (refers to 2001). 
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